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The Truth Relative to the Burning of Moscow

by Count Rostopschin

            Ten years have elapsed since the burning of Moscow, and I am still handed down to history and posterity, as the author of an event which, according to general opinion, was the principal cause of the annihilation of Buonaparte's army -- of his subsequent dethronement -- of the salvation of the Russian Empire, and of the emancipation of Europe. I had reason, no doubt, to be proud of such titles; but, never having usurped the rights of any man, and being tired of hearing always the same stories, I have determined to make truth, which alone should dictate history, speak for itself.

            When the fire had in three days consumed three-fourths of the houses in Moscow, Napoleon felt all the importance of such an event, and foresaw the effect it would have on the Russian nation, which was justified in attributing this disaster to him, on account of his presence, and that of 130,000 men under his command. He thought of a sure way of withdrawing in the eyes of Russia, and of the whole of Europe, all the odium from his own person, and of making it fall on the head of the Russian Government at Moscow. It was then that the Bulletins of Napoleon proclaimed me the incendiary. The newspapers and pamphlets of the day, one after another, repeated this accusation, and gave authority to all who have written since the campaign of 1812, to present as authentic a story entirely false.

            I shall now recapitulate the principal grounds on which was founded the supposition of the burning of Moscow, being my work, I will reply to them by facts, well know to all Russians. I will, at least, be entitled to belief on this ground, that, I give up my title to the finest character of that day, and overturn, myself, the edifice of my own celebrity.

            1st -- Napoleon, in his 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24th Bulletins, distinctly asserts, that the burning of Moscow had been planned and prepared by the Rostopschin Government.

            To plan and execute so horrible a project, as that of setting fire to the Capital of the Empire, required a stronger motive than the certainty of those evils which would befall the enemy. Although the three-fourths of the town were consumed, there still remained enough of buildings to lodge the whole of Napoleon's army. It was quite impossible that the fire should communicate on all sides; and, so long as the wind was not violent, the fire would have ceased for want of nourishment, on account of the gardens, the open spaces and the boulevards. Thus, the loss of the provisions stored in those houses which might have been consumed, would have been the only real evil done to the enemy, and the poor fruits of a measure as atrocious as senseless.

            The provisions, however, remaining in the houses, amounted to very little, for Moscow is provisioned by land and water carriage, from the Spring to the month of September, and afterwards by boats until the winter. War, however, having broken out in June, and the enemy being already masters of Smolensk, all sorts of conveyance ceased in the beginning of August, and no care was taken to victual a town without defense, and threatened with occupation. Some time later, the greatest part of the flour which was in the warehouses of the Government, as well as what the meal merchants had, was converted into bread and biscuit, so that during the thirteen days which preceded the entry of Napoleon into Moscow, 600 chariots laden with biscuit, oatmeal, and oats, were despatched every morning to the army. Even the motive fore depriving the enemy of victuals could not therefore exist. A still more important consideration would have stayed the project of the burning (if even it had been decided on;) namely, that of Napoleon on his leaving Moscow forcing Prince Kutousow to a battle, the chanced of which were in favour of the French army, which was double that of the Russian, already encumbered with their wounded, and with a part of the population which had quitted Moscow.

2nd -- The combustible matter prepared by one Schmidt, who was employed in preparing a balloon.

            The burning lever having been organized, or prepared, the combustible matter of Schmidt ends in smoke. This man, who pretended to have found the means of giving a direction to balloons, was occupied in making one, and through mere charlatanism, requested silence concerning his operations. Too much importance has been attached to this balloon, in order to throw ridicule on the Russians; but jocrisses (nincompoops) are scarce among them, and an inhabitant of Moscow could never have been persuaded that this Schmidt could have destroyed the French army with a balloon similar to the one the French made use of at the battle of Fleurus.

            Besides, where was the necessity of establishing a manufactory of combustible matter? Hay and straw would have been much more in the reach of incendiaries than fire-works, which require precautions, and which are as difficult to conceal as to be managed by inexperienced people.

            3rd -- The petards found in the stores of my hotel at Moscow.

            Why should I have placed petards in my hotel? In lighting the stores, they would have been discovered, and even in the event of an explosion, there would have been some victims, but no fire.

            A French physician, who had been quartered in my house, told me that they had found some cartridges in one of the stores; if at the end of some time they grew to be petards, there is no reason why, at last, they should not become globes of compression (globes de compression.) For my part, I leave the invention of these petards to the Bulletin or if really they did find some cartridges in the stores of my house, they may have been put there after my departure, very likely to furnish one little proof more of my having the design to set fire to Moscow, just as the fuses, which they pretend to have found on the incendiaries, might have been taken from the private warehouses, where they were in the habit of making fire-works for the fetes in Moscow and the surrounding country.

4th -- The confessions of those incendiaries who were taken, condemned, and executed.

            Here we have a proof given out as certain and convincing, being backed by a condemnation, the confessions of the criminals, and their execution. Napoleon announces, in his 20th Bulletin, that some stove lighters (chaffeurs) had been taken, condemned, and executed; that all these wretches, loaded with combustibles, and setting fire to the town by my orders, had been taken in the fact.

            The 20th Bulletin announces, that it was 300 malefactors who had set light to the town in five hundred places at once. This is materially impossible. Is it possible, besides, to suppose that I should have let these malefactors out of prison on the sole condition of firing the town, or that they would have executed my orders during my absence, and in the face of an entire host of enemies? But I will now convince those who will credit demonstration, that these men were never employed.

            In proportion, as the army of Napoleon approached a capital town, the civil authorities emptied the prisons, and forwarded the prisoners to Moscow, under an escort of military; whence it happened, that towards the end of August, the prisons of Moscow contained the prisoners of the Government of Witepsk, Mobilow, Minsk, and Smolensk. They amounted, including those of the Government of Moscow, to 810 individuals, who, under the charge of a garrison battalion, were sent to Nigeni-Novgorod, two days before the enemy's entry into Moscow. They arrived at their destination; and in the beginning of 1813, the Senate, to avoid the inconvenience that would attend the sending all of them back to their respective Governments, directed the civil tribunals of Nigeni-Novorod to try them.

            But the trials of the incendiaries, which were printed (and of which I have a copy), affirm that thirty individuals were brought up, who are each named, of whom thirteen, being convicted of having set fire to the city by my orders, were condemned to death. Nevertheless, according to the twentieth and twenty-first Bulletins, one hundred were first shot, and then afterwards three hundred. On my return to Moscow, I found out and spoke to three out of the thirty unhappy men mentioned in the trial; one was servant to Prince Sibirsky, and who had been suffered to remain in the House; second, and old sweeper of the Kremlin; the third, a warehouse keeper.

            All three, on being questioned separately, told me the same, two years after, as they did in 1812: namely, that they were arrested, all three, in the beginning of September (old style), one at night in the street, the two others at the Kremlin during the daytime. They remained some time in the guardhouse at the Kremlin; at last, one morning they were taken with ten other Russians, to the barracks of the quarter called the Young Ladies' Field. Here they were joined by seventeen others, and they were conducted under a strong guard to the front of a convent of Petrowsky, which is near the Boulevard. They waited there an hour, when a great many officers arrived on horseback and alighted. The thirty Russians were drawn up in a line, against the wall of the convent and shot. Their bodies were hung up to the lamps, with a placard in Russian and French, declaring that they were incendiaries. The other seventeen went away and were no further molested.

            The account of these people (if it be true), would lead one to suppose that there was no examination, and that the thirteen men were shot by orders from the commander.

            5th -- The confessions of a man calling himself a Policeman, who was found in the vaults of the Kremlin, and was cut to pieces by Napoleon's Body Guards.

            This unfortunate police officer, or at least who pretended to be such, might have urged his being there by command of his superior officer; but who was his superior, was it S.? A magistrate, an officer, a sergeant; what was he there to execute? This one, however, they did not honour with the slightest notice. He was cut to pieces by the Body Guards.

            6th -- All the fire-engines carried away.

            I had sent off two thousand firemen (pompiers), and ninety-six fire engines (there being three for each quarter of the town) the evening before the enemy entered Moscow. There was a body of officers attached to the service of these fire-engines, and I did not think it proper to leave them in Napoleon's service; having already withdrawn all civil and military authorities.

            I is very natural, however, that the people should wish to know who set fire to and caused the burning of Moscow; therefore, I give here all the details which I am able concerning this event, which Napoleon accuses me of, which the Russians attribute to him, and which the Russian population which remained at Moscow was composed of people of the lowest order, and it is by no means unlikely that they contributed to spread the flames, the better to be able to plunder during the confusion. But even this would yet be no convincing proof of there being a preconcerted plan to burn this city, or that this plan and the execution were my doing.

            The principal feature in the Russian character is disinterestedness, and a tendency to destroy rather than give up, always ending their disputes in these words, "Well, then, it shall be for nobody." In the numerous conversations which I have had with merchants, manufacturers, and the common people, I have heard them say, when expressing, with grief, their fear lest Moscow should fall into the hands of the enemy; "It would be much better to set fire to it."

            During my stay at the head-quarters of Prince Kutousow, I saw many persons who had escaped from Moscow after the fire, and who boasted of having set fire to their own houses. These are what details I gathered on my return; I give them just as I received them; I was not, of course, an eye witness to them, being absent at the time.

            There is at Moscow a street entirely occupied by coach wheel-wrights and coach manufacturers. When the army of Napoleon arrived, many Generals and Officers visited this quarter, and having inspected the establishments, they chose carriages, and wrote their names on the panels. The owners, not wishing to supply the enemy with carriages, with one accord, set fire to the warehouses.

            One tradesman, who had retired to Saroslave, left his nephew to take care of his house. On the return of the civil authorities to Moscow, this nephew came and told them that there were seventeen bodies stifled in the cellar, and this is the account which he gave of the business: The day after the entrance of the enemy into Moscow, four of their soldiers came to the house, searched it, and, finding nothing worth taking away, they went down into the cellar, which was on the ground floor, where they discovered about one hundred bottles of wine; that, after having, by signs, directed the nephew to take care of them, they returned in the evening, with thirteen others and, lighting candles, went down into the cellar, and began drinking, singing, and finally snoring. The young Russian, seeing them plunged in the sleep of drunkenness, at once conceived the idea of putting and end to them. He shut, therefore, the cellar door, heaped stones against it, and fled into the street. At the end of an hour or two, having reflected that these seventeen men might possibly escape, and, if they met him, put him to death, he determined to set fire to the house, which he did with some lighted straw. The seventeen wretched men were most likely suffocated by the smoke.

            Two men -- one a porter to M. Mauravieve, the other a merchant and house keeper -- were taken in the act of setting fire to their houses, and shot.

            On the other hand, Moscow, being the termination of Napoleon's expedition into Russia, the plunder of the town had been promised to his army. The soldiers, after having passed Smolensk, were in want of victuals, and were sometimes fed with rye and flesh of horses. It is quite natural that these troops, on entering an immense city, which has been abandoned by its inhabitants, should spread themselves into the houses, to endeavour to find something to eat, or to pillage. Even on the first night of the occupation of Moscow, the large range of shops in front of the Kremlin had been set on fire; afterwards, and almost incessantly, fires broke out in various quarters of the city; but on the fifth day, a violent gale of wind carried the flames on all sides -- and in three days they devoured 7,632 houses. Very little precaution, to was to be expected from the soldiers, who, in searching houses at night, carried pieces of candles, torches, and lighted brands; many even kindled large fires in the court-yards, to keep themselves warm. The order which authorized each regiment, bivouacked in the neighborhood of the town, to send a certain number of men to plunder those houses already burnt, was in some measure an invitation or a permission to increase their number. But what most strengthens the Russians in their belief of Moscow being set on fire by the enemy, is the useless blowing up of the Kremlin.

            This is what I have to say concerning the fire of Moscow -- which appeared the more sublime from being without a precedent in history.

            Napoleon quitted, for three days, the Kremlin, and returned to wait for peace in the midst of smoking ashes; but his destiny was fulfilling, and the hand of Providence marked out Moscow as the beginning of his fall -- St. Helena, the end of his career.

            I am now about to make some observations on a work lately published by M. M________ with the title of "The Russian Expedition." I have found in it much truth and impartiality, with the exception of the historical part of the occupation of Moscow. I shall say nothing further concerning the fire; but I will expose some mistakes of M. M_______ relating to some facts which he mentions, by repeating the assertions of several writers who care little about truth. This has nothing to do with the military operations which the author witnessed, and which he describes like an experienced officer. His criticism is clever; he has not made a romance of history, and resembles, in nothing, those authors who delight in abusing, not only individuals, but whole nations; as for instance, the author of Les Fastes de la France, who calls the Russian nation "cattle with the face of men;" the Mirroir, which asserts that a Russian in battle braves death through fear of the knout; the newspapers which delight in describing the Russian armies as savages and Cossacks; and other collections of stupid calumnies and series of lies, as, for instance, de la Russie et de l'Esclavage; du Desastre de Moscow, &c. For what regards myself, if I were to repeat all the absurdities related of me, I should never have done. I am at one moment, sprung from nothing; in the next, of very low extraction, employed in the meanest situations at Court, buffoon to the Emperor Paul; destined to enter into orders, a pupil of Archbishop Platow, having studied in all the towns of Europe; I am both fat and thin, tall and short; a kind-hearted man, and a brute. Being by no means offended by the silly things which the historical quacks (chiffonniers del historie) have said of me, I shall merely here give some statement of the time I have served: I was an officer in the Body Guard and Gentleman of the Chamber in the reign of the Empress Catherine II; chief Aide-de-camp, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Director in Chief of Inland Communication and General Commander-in-chief of the Town and Government of Moscow, under the present Emperor. As to my origin, even at the hazard of offending all those gentlemen whose thoughts lie under a bonnet rouge; I will inform them that the head of our family is descended in a direct line from one of the sons of Genghis Kahn, and came to settle in Russia about three centuries ago.

            In the work on which I am making these observations, M. M________, characterizes me as a very violent man; he who first said this at a venture (for others have repeated it since) would be much pushed to give any proofs of what he has asserted. Before a man gives his opinions concerning the actions and conduct of a man in office, I think he should, in common justice, pay some attention to the time, the places, and the circumstances, and become thoroughly acquainted with the motives acted upon. Take away, for instance, from the administration of 1812, the brand with which Napoleon, for his own sake, armed me, every one will see one continued system, from which I swerved not, and which I put into practice with calmness and patience. Another person, perhaps, in my place, would have been less active; but there were three motives which continually stimulated my zeal at that unfortunate period: The honor of my country, the importance of the post entrusted to me by my Sovereign, and gratitude for the benefits conferred upon me by the Emperor Paul I. At that time, all were so occupied, that there was no time for being ill, otherwise, I know not how I supported so much fatigue. Between the taking of Smolensk and my departure from Moscow, which was twenty-three days, I did not once lie down in bed. I slept merely on a couch with my clothes on, continually awakened by the arrival of despatches, which came from all quarters, and couriers whom I spoke with, and despatched often immediately. I have acquired the conviction, that there is always a way of being useful to one's country, when she cries "Sacrifice thyself for my welfare." We then fo rget all danger -- we are overcome with all difficulties, and are regardless of what may happen; but as soon as our thoughts rest upon ourselves, and that we begin to calculate chances, all we do will be of no use, and we shall become as one of the crowd.

            I had two important objects in view, on which I depended for the destruction of the French army, which were the maintaining the tranquility of Moscow, and making the inhabitants quit it. I succeeded even beyond my expectations. Everything was quiet even to the very moment of the entrance of the enemy, and out of 240,000 inhabitants, there remained but 10 or 12,000, who were either trades people, foreigners, or of the lowest class, but not a single person of note, either of nobility, clergy, or citizens. The senate, the tribunals, every person in office, had quitted the town some days before its occupation. I wished to hinder Napoleon from having the possibility of making acquaintances, from communicating with the interior, and from putting in practice that influence which the French had acquired in Europe, by means of her literature, her fashions, her cookery, and her language. By these means some reconciliation might have been brought about; some confidence might have been gained; and, in fine, some service exacted; but amongst those who were found in Moscow, all seduction was as unavailable as in the midst of the deaf and dumb.

            Had the public tranquility of Moscow undergone any change, many sinister impressions might have been made on the minds of the Russians, whose eyes were fixed upon her, and who had taken her as a guide and model. Hence it was that that ardent patriotism, that desire to sacrifice oneself, that warlike ardour, and that thirst of vengeance on an enemy who had dared to penetrate so far. In proportion as the news of the occupation of Moscow arrived in the provinces, the people became quite frantic, and, forsooth, an event of such a nature was calculated to appear extraordinary to a nation, whose soil had been untrod by an enemy for near a century, reckoning from the expedition of Charles XII, King of Sweden. Napoleon had no better luck; both of them lost their army, and both fled -- the one to the Turks, the other to the French.

            The little paper which I published in 1807, was written, with the intention of warning the inhabitants of towns against the resident Frenchmen, who were desirous of familiarizing their minds to the idea of being conquered by the armies of Napoleon. I own that I did not treat them in it very civilly; but we were at war, and it was quite allowable for the Russians not to like them at that time. But the war once over, the Russian has no grudge, but returns to that sympathy which always exists between two brave nations. He does not retain that ill will which Frenchmen, even now, show towards foreigners, and who cannot forgive the two-fold occupation of Paris, and their three years stay in France. I would merely ask, besides what country is there in the world, to which 3,630 Frenchmen, living in a capital about to be invested by their own countrymen, could have been allowed to remain, not only in peace, but even attending to their commerce, and following their different trades. No one was insulted, and the wine shops, in the pretended confusion of Napoleon's entrance, never could have been pillaged, because, by my directions, not a single drop of wine was left in them.

            The young tradesman, who was torn to pieces by the people, but who was reported to have fallen a victim to his own imprudence, had composed, not translated, a Proclamation for Napoleon; his wish was to accuse other people, but being found guilty by the Senate, he was condemned. This man was the only traitor in the whole city of Moscow; his ideas had been perverted by a German teacher, who was a member of a secret association. The father of the unfortunate being, was so indignant at his conduct, that he wished even to put an end to him himself.

            The Director of the post, at Moscow, was never exiled into Siberia, but merely sent to Boronege, for far different motives than those concerning a German newspaper.

            The Proclamations which I published, had no motive but that of calming uneasiness; everyone, however, knew what was going on; the news of the army came in quick succession from Smolensk to Moscow. The matter of my Bulletins was made from communications which I received, in the first instance, from General Barclay, and in the next, from Prince Kutousow. As to the expressions, they could not possibly be more offensive to the enemy than the French ones of 1814, in which they said, that the Russians were very fond of the flesh of young children.

            There has never been any ill will between the Prince Kutousow and myself; at any rate, that was not the time to think of it. We had no interest in deceiving one another, and certainly, we could not combine the burning of Moscow, since no one ever thought of such a thing. In the interview, it is true, which I had with him at the Barriers, he assured me he thought of coming to a general engagement; and that, in the evening, after a council of war, which was held in a hurry, he addressed a letter to me, in which he said that, in consequence of the movements of the enemy, he was obliged, with regret, to abandon Moscow, and that he was going to take a position on the high road to Razane.

            After what I have said, it will be seen that, M. M________ has created a contradiction; for by establishing an enmity between Prince Kutousow and myself, he destroys all possibility of any mutual confidence. If one became, necessarily, the enemy of all one finds fault with, M. M________'s work would create him a great number.

            The incessant retreat of our armies, having excited a general outcry, the people, as everywhere else, made up of, perhaps, ten criers and thousands of echoes, expressed a wish to see the Prince Kutousow at the head of the troops. The Emperor appointed him as such, but it was done to put an end to the differences which arose between General Barclay and Prince Bagration, each of whom commanded an army, and who were both encamped under the walls of Smolensk. This is all I had to do with the nomination of Prince Kutousow, which M. M________ attributes to me. Though I render every homage to the talents, the scars, and the age of Prince Kutousow; and though I wish not to criticize his military operations, yet, I am as thoroughly convinced that he would never have reached Borodino with 93,000 men, as I am that General Barclay would have attacked the enemy at Krasnoy, and would not have remained four days march behind at the moment of the enemy's passing the Beresina. Until the war of 1806, I had no more hatred for Napoleon than the meanest Russian; I spoke of him as little as I could help; for in my opinion, people wrote about him a great deal too soon, and a great deal too much. Europe will long remember the evils he caused her to suffer, and among enlightened people, two generations will still be divided -- enthusiasm for the conqueror, or hatred for the invader; for my part, I will here freely make my confession about him: Napoleon was, after his campaigns of Italy and Egypt, a great General, in my opinion; the benefactor of France when he stifled the Revolution at the time of his consulate; a despot, dangerous for the whole of Europe, when he became Emperor; an insatiable conqueror up to the year 1812; a man drunk with glory and blinded with his good fortune at the time he undertook the conquest of Russia; a mind entirely cast down at Fontainebleau, and after Waterloo; and at St. Helena, a second Prophet Jeremiah.

            In short, I think that he died of grief from being no longer able to disturb the world, and from seeing himself bound, as it were, to a rock, there to be devoured by the recollection of the past, and contemplation of the present, without one person to blame but himself, himself having been the cause both of his rise and his fall.

            I have often regretted that the General Tamara, who was commissioned in 1789, to organize a fleet in the Mediterranean, during the war with the Turks, had not accepted the proposal of Napoleon to enter into the Russian service; but in the rank of Major, (to which he aspired, having been Lieutenant-Colonel of the Corsican National Guard), was refused him. I have often had his letter in my hand.

            As to the French Revolutionists and their followers in other countries, I always detested their designs as soon as I saw the result. All that has passed during the last thirty years in Europe, has served to give me a thorough idea of those whose purpose is to overthrow all Governments. No matter under what names these sort of people either pass or hide themselves, egotism guides them, interest blinds them.

            Unfortunately, in this age, in which so many events have accustomed two generations to neglect those principles which prescribe a due respect for the altar and the throne, a handful of factious or ambitious men succeed with ease in seducing a portion of the people, in feeding their imagination, according to circumstances, with happiness, riches, liberty, glory, conquest, and vengeance. By these means they revolt, are marched off and precipitated into an abyss of misery. Some men are come to such a pass as to regard revolutions as a thing necessary to the spirit of the age, and to increase the avalanche of insurrection, they puff off, in perspective, the advantages of a constitution, without once troubling themselves to think whether it will suit the country, the inhabitants, or their neighbours; this is the great malady of the age. It is a fever far more dangerous than any other, even the plague; for not only is it both epidemic and contagious, but is caught even by reading and conversing. The symptoms are strongly marked; it begins by a flow of high-sounding words which appear to come from the mouth of a legislator, from a friend to humanity, from a prophet or a powerful chieftain. After this comes a deluge of abuse against all authority, a thirst after power, an inordinate desire for wealth, a thirst for projects, and, at last, a disorder in the brain, during which the sick person wishes to climb as high as possible, overturning everything which he meets in his way. In spite of all the efforts of these disturbers, the people, though led astray for a short time, will always end by returning to the ancient system of things, either through reflection, or through fatigue of a change, or even through the very excess itself; for it is easily conceived that everyone cannot be rich, and that there is not room enough on the throne for a million people who wish to be Sovereigns, and reign over those who don't at all care to be reigned over. History has already proved that all people who have revolted, have made their situation much worse, and pay very dear for their error, since if in the struggle, the legitimate Sovereign should fall in the defense of his rights against rebellious subjects, then these last will pass under the scepter of a military despot, for in default of a Napoleon, they will find easily enough an Iturbide.

            The Deputation of the Town of Moscow, of which M. M________ speaks, was composed of a dozen people, badly dressed. He who, on this solemn occasion, represented the nobility, the clergy, the public authorities, and the body of merchants of the capital, was nothing more than a corrector of the press. Napoleon, seeing the absurdity of this farce, turned his back on him. The escort of dragoons, of which M. M________ speaks, was composed of ten men who were accompanying the carriage in which were the Government papers. As to myself, I was on horseback, and did not quit the city until the firing of the first cannon from the Kremlin.

            Before I finish this short statement, I shall make some few observations on Napoleon's Bulletins, dated from Moscow, and it will be then seen whether these passages can possibly serve as materials for History.

19th Bulletin 

Sept. 16

The most complete anarchy reigned in the town; drunken madmen rushed about the streets, and set fire to the houses in every direction.

Rostopschin's Observation:

Those few who still remained, shut themselves up through fear and uncertainty. If, at the time of Napoleon's entry into Moscow, these madmen were running about, why did he not have them arrested?

19th Bulletin:

The Governor Rostopschin had carried away all the merchants and trades-people, through whose means tranquility might have been restored.

R’s Observation:

All these people had, of their own accord, departed several days before. Besides, what order could trades-people have restored in a place of head quarters, and in a whole army?

19th Bulletin:

More than 400 Frenchmen and Germans had been arrested by his orders.

In short, he had caused the firemen to be carried away, together with their engines.

R’s Observation:

Not one. I have already said that the ninety-six fire engines, with their appurtenances, had been sent into the interior.

19th Bulletin:

Thirty thousand wounded, or sick Russians, are abandoned in the hospitals, without assistance or food.

R’s Observation:

Sixteen or seventeen thousand set out upon four thousand chariots, for Kalomna, the evening before the occupation; from thence, they sailed down the ??? in large covered boats, as far as the Government of Rezane, where hospitals were established. Two thousand wounded remained at Moscow.

19th Bulletin:

The Russians had lost fifty thousand men at the battle of the Moskowa. An account has been made out of the Russian Generals either killed or wounded in the battle; it amounts to forty-five or fifty.

R’s Observation: 

We lost in killed and wounded from 35 to 36,000 men, 1,732 officers, and 18 Generals. Napoleon lost in killed and wounded more than 50,000 men, 1,200 officers, and 49 Generals. I have all these facts from an officer who was employed to ascertain them, and who was in the service of the Prince of Neufchatel. This officer being wounded at the battle of Borodino, remained at the hospital of Galitzine.

20th Bulletin:

Sept. 17

We found in the house of that wretch Rostopschin, some papers, and a letter half finished.

R’s Observation:

All those papers, most of them of no value, were re-taken by the Cossacks, and were not worth being returned to me. I was not taken by surprise, still less astonished at the entrance of the enemy, so that I could have had plenty of time to finish my letter. I went out at a gentle trot by the barrier of Rezane, nor did I quit the Boulevard till I was informed that the French advance-guard had entered the town.

20th Bulletin:

On the 16th, a violent wind arose: 3 or 400 wretches set fire to the city, in 500 places at once, by order of the Governor Rostopschin.

R’s Observation:

So that these 3 to 400 wretches remained four whole days surrounded by the French army, on purpose to wait for a violent wind. They must have been very clever, indeed, to have set fire to the city in 500 places at once, being themselves only 3 or 400. As for my name, it serves as a burden to the fire, just as that of Marlbrook does to the song.

20th Bulletin:

There were 1,600 churches destroyed.

R’s Observation:

There were only 267.

20th Bulletin:

This loss to Russia will be incalculable; it would not be the least exaggerating were we to reckon it at several thousand millions.

R’s Observation:

According to the estimate of a Commission appointed for that purpose, the damage done in the town and whole Government of Moscow, both by the war and fire, amounted only to three hundred and twenty-one millions of rubles: this is somewhat far from thousands of millions.

20th Bulletin:

Thirty thousand wounded and sick Russians were burnt alive.

R’s Observation:

I have already said, that there remained but 2,000, and the two hospitals in which they were, were not so much as scorched.

20th Bulletin:

And thus 200,000 honest citizens have been reduced to beggary by this detestable act of Rostopschin, executed by a set of wretches let loose from the prisons.

R’s Observation:

On my return to Moscow, after the enemy’s departure, I found 12 to 1,500 of the lower class in a state of the utmost misery; these were lodged, clothed, and fed during the whole year, at the expense of the Government; as for the wretches employed in the burning, according to this Bulletin, they were then at least 50 leagues from Moscow, having quitted it four days previous.

20th Bulletin:

Our soldiers have found, and still find, a great quantity of pelisses and furs for the winter, Moscow being the grand emporium for these things.

R’s Observation:

Very true, but these furs are bought as soon as the inland communication begins, and as the militia of Moscow, Twer, Garoslaw and Wladimir had bought 71,000, of course there did not remain a great many.

20th Bulletin:

The burning of this capital will retard the progress of Russia for at least a century.

R’s Observation:

The capital has been rebuilt, which is a proof that the inhabitants are not ruined. It contains very nearly the same number of inhabitants as before the fire; there is only one difference in it, which is, that all the new houses are built of brick. Magnificent palaces, whole streets entirely new, and most superb squares, make it already one of the finest towns in Europe, thanks to the care and paternal anxiety of the Emperor Alexander. Thus then, Russia, instead f being retarded a century, has had an opportunity of trying her strength, her riches, and her gigantic resources.

20th Bulletin:

We found in the Kremlin several ornaments used in the coronation of the Emperors, as well as all the flags taken from the Turks for a hundred years back.

R’s Observation: 

The ornaments belonging to the Coronations, and which form part o the public treasure, as well as those of the Patricians, estimated at 21 millions of rubles, had been sent off to Nigeni-Novgorod, and to Vologda, long before the enemy’s approach; as for the flags taken from the Turks, they are all at this moment in the arsenal of Petersburgh.

21st Bulletin:

Sept. 20 

Three hundred stove-lighters (chaffeurs) have been arrested and shot.

R’s Observation:

Here, then, there is a mistake of 287; for I have already said that only 13 were put an end to.

21st Bulletin:

The fine palace of Catharine, lately furnished in a superb style —

R’s Observation:

I had never been furnished at all; being quite at the extremity of the city, it was converted into barracks during the reign of the Emperor Paul, and employed as a hospital for the wounded.

21st Bulletin:

At the same time that Rostopschin was employed in having the fire engines carried away, he left us 60,000 firelocks, 150 cannon, and 1,500,000 cartridges, &c.

R’s Observation:

Sixteen hundred firelocks, which I had had repaired at the arsenal, were given to the militia of Moscow. As for cannon, there were 94 six-pounders, with their carriages and powder-wagons; they were sent off to Nigeni-Novgorod before the enemy’s entrance, who found but six cannons, which were burst, and two enormous culverins in the arsenal. Besides, as Napoleon was obliged to leave, at the Kremlin, more than 1,000 carriages of all descriptions, he could not, of course, have carried away our cannon, and we should, therefore, have found them in the same place. The greater part of this artillery served in the campaign of 1813, with the militia formed by General Count Tolstoy. One of the powder-magazines, where the cartridges for the Russian army were made, was left, it is true, on the very night of its passage through Moscow. It was not set fire to at all, by the very same neglect which caused the bridge of Leipzig to be set fire to too soon.

23RD BULLETIN:

Oct. 9

A Madonna, adorned with diamonds, has been just found, and sent, as well as other treasures, to Paris. 

R’s Observation:

It is the custom in Russia, to adorn, with precious stones, those figures which are held in the greatest veneration. It appears, however, that this trophy has not found its way into France any more than the enormous cross which surmounts the great belfry named Fvanveliki; this cross was merely of iron guilt; but a German traveler, Adam Olearius, who came to Moscow in the time of the Czar Alexis, pretended (God knows on what authority,) that this cross was of massive silver, gilt over; when, however, it was found out to be only iron, it was left where it was.

23RD BULLETIN:

It appears, however, that Rostopschin is mad. 

R’s Observation:

I cannot conceive why Napoleon makes me out to be mad.

23RD BULLETIN:

At Woronovo he set fire to his own house.

R’s Observation:

I set fire to my own house for the reason which I gave in a paper I caused to be stuck against the church door; and I merely, in fact, anticipated the orders given to an officer who was sent for that purpose to Woronovo, and found nothing but a heap of ashes; he told this himself to a Russian Colonel, who picked him up in the retreat after the passage of the Berezina. Napoleon was fond of this sort of work — for instance, the order given to Marshal Mortier to set fire, most particularly, to both my houses in Moscow, (Expedition de Russie, tome ii, page 244). The one at the barrier was burnt to the ground, but the town hall was not, because the day after the departure of the French, every street in Moscow was filled with Cossacks, and armed peasantry.

23RD BULLETIN: 

The Russian army disavows the burning of Moscow; the real authors of this wicked affair are held in detestation: Rostopschin is looked upon as a species of Marat. He has, however, found consolation in the company of the English commissary named Wilson.

R’s Observation:

The Russian army was thoroughly persuaded that Moscow had been set on fire by the enemy, and could not, by any means, look upon me as a species of Marat, as at that time they knew not that such a person had ever existed. I had no need of consolation; I grieved for the loss of my comrades without giving a single thought to my own; nor did I every see Mr. Wilson, until I joined head-quarters.

23RD BULLETIN:

With much difficulty, we have succeeded in rescuing a part of the sick and wounded Russians from the burning hospitals and houses; there remain but 4,000 of these unhappy beings. The number of those who have perished in the fire is very considerable.

R’s Observation: 

No pains whatever were taken to withdraw our sick and wounded from the hospitals: they were in danger of dying of hunger; for, in fact, the sick and wounded of Napoleon’s own army had but very little to eat. I found 1,600 alive, huddled together in the hospital Cheremetew, quite overcome through want of food, and it was with the greatest trouble that one half only, were saved and brought about. 

26th Bulletin:

Oct. 23

Moscow is absolutely now a filthy place, unwholesome and dirty in the extreme.

R’s Observation:

Why did Napoleon stay there six and thirty days?

26th Bulletin:

A population of two hundred thousand souls wandering about in the woods, and dying of hunger, is seen seeking for a handful of herbs amongst its ashes, to save them from starvation.

R’s Observation:

The soldiers of Napoleon, not being able to find anything to eat, wandered about in the villages, hoping to find wherewithal to assuage their hunger. These 200,000 Russians must, therefore, have existed more than a whole month without any food at all.

26th Bulletin:

The Emperor undermined the Kremlin; the Duke of Treviso blew it up on the 23rd, at two in the morning; every atom was destroyed; this ancient citadel, this first palace of the Czars was —

R’s Observation:

One steeple, two sides of a wall, two small turrets, and about a quarter of the arsenal, were the only parts which were blown up. The palace of the Czars remains untouched; even the fire left it unhurt. The repairs, at the utmost, cost but 500,000 francs. The Kremlin still remains with all its ancient recollections, and one more added to them; that which Napoleon left by venting his ill humour upon bricks as a last farewell to Moscow.

Napoleon had been blinded by his preceding success; he supposed that Russia would have been entirely subjugated as soon as he was in possession of the capital, and that the Emperor Alexander would prefer terms of peace.

            But, with all the genius which he possessed before 1812, he deceived himself doubly, and thereby, saw all his plans fail. He had no idea of the firmness of the Emperor of Russia, and had never known the character of the Russians, which upon this occasion, showed itself in all its force; all it stood in need of was a great and imminent danger, in order to develop as great and steady a determination. Strangers, for want of a knowledge of the language, know little more of the Russian than his features and dress. Much ridicule has been cast upon their beards, and those that wore them were looked upon as savages. But the Russian, however, has proved that he is superior to many nations, being alike, inaccessible to fear, and incapable of treachery; he bears in his moral energy and in his physical force, the conviction of success. He knows no obstacle or danger. He exclaims, "everything is possible; why not? One cannot die twice." And with these words in his mouth, he undertakes everything, fails or succeeds.

            He becomes, oftentimes, a hero, without knowing or having the least vanity on that account.

            If he is praised for any action, he will answer, "God assisted me, it is no wonderful affair. I am a man just like anyone else." The Emperor Alexander, in the year 1812, having exclaimed, "War until death!" The Russians answered, "We are ready." There is no occasion to stimulate them either by promises or rewards. There was no need to say more than, "come along," and they followed you; "give," and they brought all they possessed. The population of Moscow was the first who was exasperated at hearing, even before the taking of Smolensk, that nothing was spared by the enemy, that houses were plundered, women were outraged, and that the churches were turned into stables. The inhabitants swore vengeance on the tombs of their fathers, and exterminated all they met with. In the neighborhood of Moscow, the peasants possessed more than 10,000 stand of arms; how many plunderers and unarmed men fell beneath their fire: they even set fire to their own houses, that the enemy who had shut themselves up in them might perish.

            Upon my return to Moscow, I saw many peasants who had come one hundred and fifty leagues, well mounted, armed with either a sabre or a lance, and who had fought along with the inhabitants of the Government of Moscow. These men, on being questioned as to the motive of their journey, answered simply, "Our comrades were in danger." Everyone knows the anecdote of a peasant of Smolensk, who was marked on the hand in order to be recognized, and who cut it off with his hatchet. An old woman, from a village in the vicinity of Moscow, brought me her two grandsons, that I might send them to the army; and placing her hands on both of their heads, with her eyes fixed on the heavens, "Go," said she, "my good friends; return not unto me, until not an enemy shall remain on Russian ground, or my curse be upon you."

            An old soldier, also, who had been lamed in Italy, and had arrived to his village, caused himself to be tied on to his saddle, that he might lead the peasants to the field. Again, a young man was sent for by his master, to Moscow, and lost his appetite and rest. After the taking of Smolensk, he requested to be sent to the army; I did so, and he perished, unfortunately, at the battle of Borodino. The courage of a Russian soldier is too well known to require praise; it is quite superfluous to stimulate him, either by promotion or by pensions; he obeys and fights without caring whether the bulletins, biographers, lithographists, or poets, describe him in a battle as the thunder, or an Avalanche, or as a Medusa, blasting, crushing, sweeping, or petrifying everything the instant it approaches.

            In short, in this brief, but terrible, struggle of Russia against the whole continent of Europe, with Napoleon at its head, every Russian had a rival in point of zeal, devotion, and fidelity. The nobility of Moscow offered the Emperor one man out of every ten, with provisions for there months, which produces 32,000 men; the Governments of Toula, Kalouga, Wladimir, and Rezane, each 15,000; and those of Twer and Faraslave, 12,000: which in all, produced 116,000 militia. The Emperor charged me with the organization of this army, and in six weeks, each was embodied upon the frontiers of its own Government. The only sons of General Apraxine, and of Count Shogonow, together with my own, the eldest of whom was hardly seventeen, served during the whole war. The son of Count Strogonow, a young man of great promise, was carried off by a ball at the battle of Craon. Those proprietors who lost most during the investment of Moscow, never presented a single petition to the indemnifying commission. It is a fact that the two Counts Razoumovsky, General Apraxine, Count Boutourline,, and myself, lost in town houses, country houses, and furniture, more than five millions of rubles. The library of Count Boutourline had been valued at a million, and not a single volume remained. The remembrance of the above will be the inheritance of his children.

            Such was the year 1812. Russia lost much in point of men, but she acquired the certainty of never being subjugated, and of becoming the grave instead of the conquest of her enemies. Her inhabitants, too little civilized to be egotists, will know well how to defend their country, without boasting of their valour. Napoleon, in this expedition, whose success might have made him the master of all Europe, sacrificed the very best of the Allied Armies, and of those very Frenchmen who, for twelve years, had fought for the ambition of him whom they placed on the throne; three hundred thousand men were mowed down by the sword, by long marches, and disease, and one hundred thousand perished of hunger, cold, and misery.

            I have spoken the truth, and nothing but the truth.

Fedor, Count Rostopschin
Paris, March 5, 1823

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